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COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
Saul Levmore* .

lNTRODUCTION
When do competitors share assets and other opportunities for
mutual gain? Conversely, when do they prefer to distinguish them
selves by establishing firm boundaries that produce a minimum of
sharing or cooperation despite potential gains from trade? Why,
for example, do competing law schools in a single city cooperate so
little in offering joint programs and economizing on certain costs
even as they use the same casebooks in their courses and borrow
from one another's libraries? Why do two competing auto makers
rarely sell one another components or use the same expert advertis
ing agency or law firm but then quite often equip their cars with
identical tires or consider the same architect when planning new
office buildings? The literatures on the boundaries of the firm and
on conflicts of interest do not much investigate these fundamental
questions, and other literatures, such as that which explores exclu
sive dealing arrangements, touch on the puzzles associated with
these questions in but passing fashion.
My focus in this Essay on the nature of the relationship between
cooperation and competition is in many ways an attempt to interest
those who work in law in what economists think of as the "make-or
buy" decisions of firms. I also aim to advance our thinking about
these decisions. The make-or-buy expression draws attention to the
choice between an organization's internal expansion on the one
hand, and its ability to purchase from externally organized produ
cers on the other. Part of my claim, or at least of my starting point,
is that the make-or-buy decision is influenced by an apparent disin
clination in some cases to share sources of supply with one's com
petitors. This influence might lead firms to choose between making
or not, which is to say between expansion on the one hand and
contentment or passivity on the other. Firms may eschew the alter
native of expanding by way of purchasing from external suppliers.
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A. 1973, Columbia;
Ph.D. 1978, J.D. 1980, Yale; LL.D. 1995, Chicago-Kent. - Ed. I am grateful for comments
received from David Butz, David Charny, Steven Croley, Clay Gillette, Ron Gilson, Kyle
Logue, Julie Roin, Roberta Romano, George Triantis, and participants at a Columbia Law
School conference.
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Part I sketches the framework for my questions and analysis and
offers some refinements to the make-or-buy perspective. Part II
sets out the central thesis. It suggests circumstances in which third
parties, or markets more generally, facilitate cooperation among
competitors. Whether the roles of these outside parties are under
stood in psychological, economic, or temporary disequilibrium
terms, they provide important lessons for the theory of the firm and
for our understanding of the make-or-buy decision. Part III returns
to the starting point and considers alternative explanations for the
puzzling arrangements that I attempt to explain. I claim, of course,
that these alternatives are inferior, but they are not without their
own attractions and lessons. Part IV turns to the role of law.
I.

COOPERATION

AND THE

SIZE OF FIRMS

Attention to the make-or-buy decision dates back at least to
Coase's famous article on the theory of the firm.1 If agency costs
did not becomes more serious as a given firm grew, then we might
expect that firm to choose to make things it needed, expanding in
the process, because it could control factors better than if it were to

buy these things from external sources which, almost by assump
tion, would generate transaction costs. The early literature thus
emphasized that a different, or competing, set of transaction costs,
namely agency costs, becomes more serious with internal expansion
so that the make-or-buy-decision weighs internal and external
transaction costs with the size of the firm hanging in the balance.2
Later authors refined this perspective, sometimes turning it on its
head, and an entire academic industry has developed in thinking
about these transaction costs.
When I refer to cooperation as a further determinant of the
firm's boundaries, I mean that if, to take a plain example, the ad
vantages associated with making something internally run up
against problems of economies of scale or simply lumpiness, then
an ability to share or to cooperate with another firm might deter
mine whether internal expansion takes place. Thus, a firm might
build a new factory, where the efficient factory size is expected to
yield output greater than the firm projects it will need for its own
immediate purposes, if it could line up another firm or even a com1. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the_Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937),
RONALD CoASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 33 (1988).

reprinted in

2. I recognize that this expression implies that a firm can be distinguished from a set of
arrangements, contracts, or norms. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the
Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1983).
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petitor, to buy some of the output of this new factory. If the trans
action were arranged in advance in the form of a joint venture or
the like, then we might think of the two firms as engaging in explicit
cooperation. If, on the other hand, the economy of scale is achieved
by an outsider building a factory of efficient size and selling its out
put to our firm and to its competitor, then we might think of the
two buyers as engaging in implicit cooperation. Falling in between
these two alternatives is the possibility that our firm builds the fac
tory itself but sells some of the output, perhaps even to a competi
tor. The trading between competitors is now explicit although the
investment in the factory was implicitly cooperative. In yet starker
contrast, our firm might be disinclined to sell to a competitor; sym
metrically, its competitor might be disinclined to buy from our firm
(which is to say its competitor). Similarly, these firms may decline
to buy components from suppliers who sell identical components to
competitors. And, in the most extreme version, they may refuse to
deal with suppliers who deal at all with competitor firms. I think of
the firms' decisionmakers in these last categories as disinclined to
cooperate. Possible motivations for these disinclinations are taken
up below. In any event, I use cooperation to signal a transaction
implicating a competitor rather than any other make-or-buy
decision.
When an enterprise, E, declines to cooperate, it may find itself
with no alternative external source of supply. Any efficient sup
plier might, for example, need to sell to E's competitors in order to
survive; E's refusal to implicitly cooperate precludes E from
purchasing its supplies. In such cases, the noncooperating firm, E,
must still decide whether to make or not, which is to say whether to
grow or not. It is thus immediately apparent that a disinclination to
cooperate bears on the size of the firm. Make-or-buy is in this way
an incomplete description of the important determinant of organi
zational arrangements with which it deals. A more complete de
scription is that a firm decides whether to make or buy or do
neither - perhaps because it prefers not to cooperate. Less obvi
ous but as important is the point that the make-or-buy choice itself
may be a product of a firm's inclination to cooperate. Transaction
costs alone might point to a decision to buy, but the difficulty or
cost of arranging for exclusivity (so as to avoid cooperation) might
lead to a decision to make.3
3. Without getting too far ahead of the argument, it is perhaps obvious that the firm
might make and sell to a competitor even though it is unwilling to buy in a cooperative way.
An upscale, elegant retailer might, for example, be unwilling to stock a product bearing the
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The disinclination to cooperate may also affect the boundaries
of such entities as families, cities, and nations which also decide
whether to undertake new ventures and modify old ones. The busi
ness firm's choices among contractual arrangements with outside
suppliers, internal growth (with or without sales to competitors),
and refusals to cooperate (even if that means neither making nor
buying) have counterparts where these other organizations are con
cerned. Some of these counterparts have received more attention
than others. The literature on international relations does not re
gard trade among nations in ways suggested by the theory of the
firm. Conventional thinking about not-for-profit entities is hardly
peppered with explorations of specialization and transaction costs.
On the other hand, the literature on local government and finance
has considered questions of annexation and privatization in terms
that would seem familiar to theorists of the corporate firm,4 and
name of a less elegant competitor, but the competitor might be willing to sell a product with
Elegant's label, and Elegant might not regard its image as tarnished by the comparison
outside of its premises. Elegant could make the product or buy it from an outsider with some
conditions attached regarding the outsider's other sales.
4. The discussion below takes account of the fact that municipalities may compete with
one another less than most business firms compete against rival firms. Cooperation may
therefore be less threatening.

In Saul Levmore, Irreversibility and the Law: The Size of Finns and Other Organizations,
18 J. CoRP. LAW 333 {1993), I argued that the tradeoff between the agency costs associated
with internal expansion and those associated with transacting with an outside entity - the
core of the make-or-buy decision - needs to be understood in a way that incorporates the
agency problems absorbed by that outside entity. The outside entity expands in order to
produce that which the first entity chooses to buy rather than make on its own. Thus, our
theory of the firm must understand agency costs in relative, or opportunity cost, tenris. X
will externalize production and make arrangements with Y when Y can produce more
cheaply than X {by enough to offset the greater friction present in X-Y arrangements as
compared to monitoring and other organizational matters internal to X). A second step in
the analysis is then to see the analogous relativistic character of "irreversibility," a term
which refers to a kind of ratcheting, stickiness, or "hysteresis" such that for legal and psycho
logical reasons organizations are slower to contract than to expand. Income tax laws, for
example, would seem to be a cause of irreversibility because the well-known lock-in effect of
realization rules makes taxpayers disinclined to sell appreciated assets, even to higher
valuing users. But because Y is likely to face the same tax laws as X, there is a serious limit
to any claim that the size of X, in terms of its make-or-buy decisions, is much influenced by
this factor. Indeed, once we see that previous analyses suffer from the failure to compare
alternatives, it becomes obvious that we can often say no more than that the more efficient a
manager, the less the need for external price signals.
One obvious implication of this approach to irreversibility and the make-or-buy decision
is that sole proprietorships are unlike firms with delegated authority. A publicly owned firm
may set up barriers to expansion because it fears that its agents will selfishly be biased toward
growth - but ex post, when these agents do lunge at opportunities for growth and avoid
efficient contractions, it is difficult to predict whether these firms will make more or buy
more than their counterparts with no separation of ownership and control. The decisions are
unlikely to be identical, unless the combination of precommitments (against internal and
other expansions) and subsequent managerial behavior magically balances at the precise
point reached by the owner-manager. Of course, sole proprietors must either absorb the
agency costs associated with contracting with outsiders or the costs associated with internal
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there are occasional hints in a variety of fields that the soil is ripe
for the planting of a unified theory of boundaries. I do not intend
in the present paper to aim so high, but I do suspect that this discus
sion, which considers a variety of examples of disinclinations to co
operate, constitutes a useful step in developing a complete theory
of boundaries.
II.
A.

Markets

THE ROLE OF MARKETS
as

Means of Implicit Cooperation

Insufficient attention has been paid to what I have been calling
the disinclination to cooperate. This inattention leaves us largely
with shared experiences, intuitions, and anecdotal evidence as the
sources of data with which we might then "explain" the cooperation
among competitors that is and is not found. More rigorous testing
of my claims will need to follow; rejection or modification and im
provement are likely.
Put plainly, one claim is that markets sometimes intermediate
and allow parties to overcome their disinclination to cooperate. It
bears emphasizing that disinclinations to cooperate even in implicit
fashion must surely have a direct effect on the decision to make or
buy; an inclination to cooperate implicitly but not explicitly may
unambiguously encourage buying rather than making even where a
competitor could internally produce - perhaps more than it needs
of some component - at a lower cost than that associated with the
best outside supplier.
A few concrete examples of the markets-as-facilitators idea
make the point better than a more abstract model or description.5
Competing auto makers equip their cars with identical tires
purchased from Firestone, Michelin, and other unrelated manufac
turers, but it would be surprising to find a component in a Ford
growth and delegation, including the costs of obtaining funds from creditors (a source dis
cussed at greater length below).
Not-for-profit organizations, including governmental units, offer fewer obvious implica
tions. I have already suggested, see id. at 356-58, that these organizations may be "stickier"
than their for-profit counterparts in both directions. Universities and museums, for example,
seem even less likely to shrink than do other organizations but they also seem less quick to
expand. There are optimistic and pessimistic explanations for this sort of behavior. I turn
below to aspects of this comparison that implicate the idea advanced here of a refusal to
cooperate. See infra Part III.
5. I am tempted to concentrate with these examples on law schools and law firms, in part
because these are fascinating organizations of great interest to most of my readers. There is a
good deal to be gained, however, from suppressing this temptation and proceeding as if the
business of law training and practice were not our real focus. In any event, it is useful to see
how much law is like other businesses. Impatient readers are of course free to think of law
reviews, schools, or firms in place of the manufacturers and retailers named below.
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automobile that was made by General Motors (and identified as
such).6 The auto makers can be described as cooperating with re
spect to the research and production skills of tire makers by buying
from common sources and declining to insist on exclusive supply
arrangements or exclusive labeling. They seem unwilling, however,
to go so far as to trade directly with one another. In other indus
tries, of course, competitors do sometimes supply one another, as
when Microsoft sells to Apple, and even in the auto industry there
is some cross-supply of this kind. Most readers, however, will share
in the observation that competitors often manifest a disinclination
to cooperate.1
Put slightly differently, but persisting with the example of the
automobile industry, we can consider cases where a single producer
of a component enjoys a comparative advantage or is simply supe
rior, perhaps because of an economy of scale. If the efficient sup
plier is itself one of the auto makers, then experience suggests that
competing auto makers will normally not cooperate despite the
lower costs, which is to say Ford will not buy and install GM brakes
in Ford cars. If, however, this supplier is a third party, then some
times - but only sometimes - Ford and GM will cooperate; both
will patronize the supplier and the third party's brakes, like tires,
will be observed in both Ford and GM vehicles. The separation or
impersonality offered by the market appears to be a necessary but

6. There are, of course, important examples of joint ventures in the auto industry,
although it is perhaps notable that GM and Toyota share in such a venture while GM and
Ford do not There is also the interesting question of identified versus anonymous suppliers.
Generally speaking, if components are supplied by a firm with something of an independent
reputation, then they are more likely to be identified as such to the consumer. But coopera
tion itself may be more likely in some industries if the supplier is anonymous. Competing
auto makers do, for instance, purchase a variety of auto body parts from common, unidenti
fied suppliers. This choice, between identified and unidentified components, may have a
great deal to do with the "original equipment tie." If consumers will buy replacement parts
on their own, as is often true for tires but not for running boards, then an auto maker may
profit in the form of lower prices from its suppliers by buying things like tires and installing
them in new vehicles with the name of their outside maker clearly identified; the idea is that
consumers may be overinclined to match the original equipment on their cars. Thus, Frre
stone will "pay" Ford in the form of prices that may be even lower than Frrestone's marginal
cost, but the maker of running boards will not offer a similar discount to Ford. One reason
not to pursue this matter is that it seems to have little bearing on the central puzzles here.
GM might also offer parts to Ford at low prices in order to take advantage of consumer
perceptions but we do not observe GM parts on Ford vehicles. The text concedes, however,
that supply arrangements between competitors are found in other industries. I return to this
mixed evidence below. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
7. The contrast between implicit and explicit cooperation is less sharp than it might be
even in the auto industry; there are components, ranging from engines to stereo systems,
regarding which competitors seem unlikely to cooperate even tlrrough the use of a third
party supplier.
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not a sufficient condition for cooperation when only implicit coop
eration is tolerable.
A simple, tempting, and perhaps unrivaled explanation of the
reason for market intermediation looks to hubris or poorly in
formed consumers. Ford may simply have too much "pride" to sell
a car with a GM part. Consumers who are bound by reputation or
tradition to Ford may cease to buy these cars if they contain GM
parts because the pres�nce of a competitor's output may signal neg
ative rather than positive things about the state of Ford's products.
I examine these and other explanations below in section II.B and in
Part III; the balance of the present section is occupied with several
other illustrations of implicit cooperation.
The extent of implicit cooperation between rivals such as Ford
and GM is fairly familiar. Such competitors do not use the same
advertising agency, even where there may be an efficiency gain be
cause separate agencies would need to engage in duplicative mar
keting studies. It is possible that the competitors could employ rival
advertising agencies which could in turn purchase consumer-survey
or other marketing data from a single outside source. A twice
removed supplier may thus overcome the disinclination to cooper
ate precisely because of its increased separation from both competi
tors. Somewhat similarly, but influenced perhaps by legal
constraints, we do not expect Ford and GM to use the same law
firm for the bulk of their legal services. This disinclination, and the
legal norm which may drive it, is likely to sacrifice potential gains
from a combination of specialization and economies of scale. We
certainly do not expect Ford to purchase services from GM's in
house

legal

counsel,

car

designer,

or

marketing

expert.

A

fabulously talented lawyer or car designer, with enough ideas and
energy to service multiple clients, may find it impossible to exploit
this talent unless, perhaps, there is sufficient separation; Ford and
GM might patronize the same investment banker, especially if their
issuance plans develop years apart, which might in tum use a single
lawyer. Ford and GM might, however, go to the same law firm for
specialized work in environmental defense or insurance matters.
The rules of professional responsibility which apply to lawyers do
not explain all these patterns. The markets-as-facilitators idea is at
least as useful in describing these configurations, although it re
mains to be seen whether it is of much predictive utility.
Rival mail-order retailers offer a comparable example, although
new puzzles arise along with each illustration. It is remarkable how
little overlap there is between a Lands' End and an L.L. Bean cata-
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logue. Indeed, a fair amount of text in each of these catalogues
gives the impression of a company seeking out exclusive suppliers

whose products or workmanship may not be available through any

other retailer. Some items are, however, explicitly labeled as com
ing from well-known suppliers whose goods can be purchased
through other means. Thus, a recent Lands' End catalogue carried
recognized brands of (Harris Tweed) sportcoats, (Rockport) walk
ing shoes, and (Coach) belts- all of which were offered as alterna
tives to the catalogue company's "own" labels. But it would be
truly startling to find a product with the L.L. Bean label in this
Lands' End catalogue. Moreover, an outsider's item that is fea
tured in one of these catalogues is then very .unlikely to be found in

the competitor's catalogue. The disinclination to cooperate in this
manner seems to generate an obvious efficiency loss as reflected in
the contrasting fact that most conventional retailers' offerings over
lap with those of their competitors. Both Bloomingdale's and Kro
ger's offer store brands in an exclusive manner, but the vast
majority of the items they carry are identified as coming from
outside suppliers and are also found in competing department
stores and supermarkets. One distinction between mail-order and
fixed-location retailers is that it is cheaper for consumers to "visit"

two catalogues when searching for one item or even a basket of

goods than it is to visit two department stores or supermarkets.8
But this distinction does not address the disinclination to cooperate
with respect to third-party suppliers. Moreover, mail-order custom
ers can be expected to value their time especially highly, and we
might expect many of these customers to shop in a given evening
with but one catalogue, paying a premium to find the best selection
or option in that one venue.9
8. On the other hand, undiversified, single-brand stores do not seem less important a part
of that industry than are single-brand catalogues in mail-order retailing. The distinction
based on search costs may therefore be unhelpful.
9. I will not try to solve all these puzzles of where we do and do not find cooperation even of the explicit kind. Consider, for example, the case of a delicatessen, Z, which makes
fabulous bread in its bakery. If Z's bread is also sold at local grocery stores or even at other
delicatessens in the same town as Z, we might be unsurprised by the explicit cooperation,
figuring that Z profits from its superior product. Any disinclination of these other stores is
overcome by their recognition of the fact that they would lose customers who would go else
where, or simply to Z itself, to buy bread and then might not return for other groceries or
foodstuffs. On the other hand, if Z refuses to sell to competitors, we might conclude that Z
hopes to attract bread-loving consumers who will then buy other products from Z. The claim
must be that Z may not be able to discriminate as successfully by simply raising the price of
its bread because it cannot raise the price just for these bread lovers. In short, many arrange
ments and practices seem to be consistent with rationality, and Z's actual practice (which was
once to hold all bread as its own, later to sell a few of its many varieties of bread to compet
ing stores, and now apparently to sell all of its varieties to other parties who sell the bread at
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Closer to home is the intriguing example of cooperation among
universities. There are notable examples of joint ventures among
universities, even alongside intense competition; in the interest of
specificity my focus is on the apparent fact of noncooperation
among American law schools. Neighboring schools would seem to
offer obvious opportunities for advantageous contractual arrange
ments with one another or through third parties because students
and faculty could easily share common resources.

Cooperation

would permit these schools to capture the benefits of economies of
scale, specialization, and under-exploited skills and investments.
There is, however, very little cooperation of this kind among close
competitors. Law schools located in the same city expend substan
tial resources on clinical programs that might often be combined in
order to offer students training that is close to their developing in
terests. Analogously, these schools might attract graduate students
by offering combined programs with access to specialized courses in
multiple institutions. Gains from trade would seem to be available
where each school otherwise offers a course on an irregular basis or
to a handful of students. Investments in faculty members could be
shared in a similar fashion. Two schools might be able to share the
costs and benefits of an unusually expensive investment or of some
one who specializes in a field that makes it difficult for one school
alone to justify an appointment. Schools might even share in fund
raising or recruiting ventures, although any disinclination to coop
erate in these arenas might be attributed to obvious hazards and
agency problems especially where they compete for the same stu
dents or donors. In any event, examples of such contractual ar
rangements are not unknown, but I think it fair to stipulate that
they are rare.10 Any experienced faculty member or administrator
might think of hundreds of ways in which proximately located and
comparable schools could cooperate in direct fashion, and yet only
a small number of explicitly cooperative ventures can be identified
at the institutional level.11 Law journals, clinics, and specialized
the same retail price as Z) may not cast much light on the various puzzles posed by other
actors and in other industries.
10. Schools do occasionally share the travel costs of applicants for faculty positions or
itinerant presenters of papers at faculty workshops. These examples of cooperation seem
trivial if only because an outsider's request for reimbursement from both hosts would amount
to profitable and conventionally unethical overrecoveries. More interesting and more com
mon sharing arrangements involve library collections because conventional wisdom would
not have suggested exceptional efficiencies in this area.
11. At the personal, individual level there is much more cooperation. Faculty members at
competing law schools invite each other to intellectual events, call on each other as referees
and colleagues, and share information about candidates on the job market. These explicit
examples of cooperation do not generate charges of disloyalty but they are also remarkably
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courses offer easy examples of ventures that might sensibly prosper
from cooperation.
Taken one at a time, each of these examples presents a number
of puzzles. In the aggregate is the further theoretical puzzle of ex
plaining both the survival of what seems to be an inefficient inclina
tion against cooperation alongside some surprising instances of
cooperation,

especially

of

the implicit kind.

The market-as

facilitator idea leads to a lower estimate of the efficiency costs of
the failure to cooperate explicitly but it generates additional puzzles
as to the location of both explicit and implicit cooperation. Com
peting law schools regularly use identical casebooks, they may out
fit offices and libraries with identical computers and research
services, they use the same architects who specialize in designing
university buildings, they all use the results of the Law School Ad
missions Test, and they even employ the same outside consultants
to advise them on such things as fundraising campaigns and public
relations. Indeed, the law school example is perhaps less puzzling
than others because these schools appear completely to tolerate im
plicit cooperation through markets and outside suppliers. Most re
tailers, by way of comparison, seem completely intolerant of
explicit cooperation but more inconsistent in their willingness to co
operate through third parties.

B.

Explaining Implicit Cooperation
1.

Firm Pride

Even if the distinction between implicit and explicit cooperation
succeeded in predicting all instances in which cooperation among
competitors was and was not found, the question would remain why
impersonal markets should so pave the way for shared ventures. I
have already suggested the simplest and most obvious possibility,
that a kind of pride envelops many organizations - and people such that it is difficult to ask for help, even to pay for help, or to
concede that others do some things better.12 We are accustomed to
people who seem incapable of asking directions when they are lost,
who insist on fixing things themselves and who take it as a sign of
informal, avoiding for example any explicit terms of exchange. A remarkable example in the
opposite camp is that there is little if any co-authorship between faculty members at neigh
boring law schools.
12. And this is the case even though economic thinking suggests rather strongly that spe
cialization in the area of one's comparative advantage can lead to mutual advantage so that
trading with another party does not imply that the other has an absolute advantage, or supe
riority, in producing that which it makes and sells.
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weakness when someone employs a professional repair person.
Business enterprises are run by people and so it is plausible that we
should expect similar instances of refusals to outsource. Moreover,
even if competitive pressures disallow such concerns, customers
may have these views and may regard firms that need outside help
as somehow weak and not worth patronizing. Firms, therefore,
might do better by signaling that they are infinitely capable and
self-contained.
This view does not perfectly predict or resolve the othenvise
puzzling patterns that we find. It would fit the facts better if all
cooperation were dodged or if apparent opportunities for implicit
cooperation were rejected precisely where the outsider would sup
ply something at the core of the enterprise, pertaining to the histori
cal strength of the disinclined firm, or especially visible to outside
observers.

Indeed, these distinctions provide some predictive

power. Even the proudest firm buys such things as light bulbs and
post-it notes from outsiders who may well supply their competitors.
Similarly, auto makers seem more likely to buy stereo systems and
leather seat covers from outsiders than they do engines and axles,
and they seem most likely to buy in cooperative fashion, which is to
say from nonexclusive suppliers who may also deal with competing
auto makers, when even less significant or distinctive components
- such as unfashioned aluminum or headlamps - are concerned.
Light bulbs and sheets of aluminum are not at the core of Ford's
enterprise, they are not part of its historical mission, and their ori
gin is not much noticed by purchasers of Ford's vehicles, so that
outsourcing is unlikely to be thought of as reflecting weakness. But
it is difficult to distinguish sound systems and air bags from twelve
volt batteries and tires with these variables.
If pride is too unscientific and irrational a concept for this exer
cise, then it is tempting to convert the argument into one about
reputation and consumers' reactions to products with intruding
components. Part III discusses the possible role of consumer igno
rance in understanding disinclinations to cooperate quite generally,
but, as for the narrower question of the preference for explicit
rather than implicit cooperation, it is difficult to make much of con
sumer ignorance. If Lands' End would lose more loyal or ignorant
customers than it would gain by offering a superior selection which
included L.L. Bean products, perhaps because these customers
would interpret the offering as a confession that Lands' End's own
products were inferior, then it is hard to see why it would not be
just as grave an error to offer Harris Tweed jackets. Catalogue afi-
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cionados may insist that these outside suppliers allow Lands' End to
offer noncompeting products, in the sense that these particular la
bels are a slight step up from the house brand.13 But this subtlety,
even if correct, seems inconsistent with the claim of consumer igno
rance because ignorance and subtlety do not dance well together.
Unsurprisingly, these catalogues' texts give no indication that the
intruding labels are superior to the catalogue's own best offerings.
And ignorance does not help to explain the practice of nonoverlap
ping arrangements with outside suppliers whose products might
otherwise be seen in multiple rival mail-order catalogues.
Pride and reputation are similarly unhelpful in explaining exam
ples of implicit cooperation. Rival mail-or�er retailers are willing
to use the same third-party delivery services. Comparable depart
ment stores may not carry one another's labels, but they do implic
itly cooperate by carrying such items as Ferragamo shoes and Ralph
Lauren shirts. These examples of behavior that seems uninformed
by considerations of pride and reputation may nevertheless offer
useful illustrations of decisions to buy rather than make.· More
complete refusals to cooperate might have generated decisions to
make and grow internally or, perhaps, to shrink into the shape of a
specialized retailer.

2.

Markets

as

Equal Dividers

An interesting possibility is that markets are useful because they
offer a method for smoothly sharing the gains from trade. The
rough claim is that bilateral monopolists will often negotiate to a
stalemate so that the extra transaction cost of an outside supplier,
or competing outsiders, may be worthwhile.14 Cases obviously exist
where markets facilitate implicit cooperation in the conventional
sense that unrelated parties are brought together through the ef
forts of entrepreneurs, but the cooperation referred to here often
involves parties who are all too aware of one another's existence.
There is a perspective from which Bloomingdale's can be seen as
the product of implicit cooperation among thousands of consumers
13. Lands' End may seek to raise the average quality of the goods it impresses upon
customers. It offers superior products but does not offer less expensive, lower quality prod
ucts attached to a specific outsider's label. Presumably, the gain from improved selection is
more than offset by the fear that consumers will either attribute the lower quality to Lands'
End itself or simply decline to read the catalogue as thoroughly once they see items they do
not like.
14. Competing outsiders are best because they eliminate the fear of collusion between
one's competitor and supplier. The fear is not, however, a great one because an outsider who
colludes with A at B's expense may eventually have some incentive to seek a better deal with
B.
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- or, through a different lens, hundreds of specialized vendors who are able to create a store to their liking through this market
solution. In this case, explicit cooperation would be quite surprising
both because the consumers would have trouble finding one an·
other and because even if forced together in a group they would be
unlikely to know or agree on a strategy for satisfying their similar
preferences. In contrast, if B loomingdale's and Neiman-Marcus pa
tronize a single outside consultant who advises on interior decor or
window displays, then the implicit cooperation is notable because
explicit cooperation might have seemed so logical.15 The term im
plicit cooperation thus refers here not to some genius on the part of
the market for conceiving synergistic gains, but rather to the ability
of markets to offer a kind of second-best solution where there is
some barrier to explic�t trading. This definition or focus is necessar
ily a bit circular or at least subjective. It draws attention to implicit
multiple-party transactions by reference to situations where two
party transactions seem easy enough to do.
The rough claim, that Bloomingdale's and Neiman-Marcus
might find themselves hiring the same outside designer of window
displays in order to avoid an explicit division of the gains from trade
through direct cooperation, seems sensible and absurd at the same
time. It seems sensible because of our intuitions about noncoopera
tion or even mistrust among keen competitors, but it seems implau
sible to think that a transaction will be avoided by resort to a
method that almost by its nature involves extra transaction costs.
In the classic bilateral situation where deadlock looms, labor and
management often resolve their pie-splitting impasses with the help
of a costly third-party arbitrator who makes suggestions or binding
agreements for legal or precommitment reasons. B ut it seems natu
ral that entrepreneurial arbitrators arise where there are specific
issues, factfinding, and legal or contractual terms to interpret and
imply. Where the workplace deadlock is centered on dividing a sur·
plus, arbitrators are more often interposed by the government, im
plicit cooperation seems relatively unusual and, in any event,
explicit cooperation is much more common than implicit
cooperation.16
15. The example assumes that these department stores compete as neighbors in one or
more locations.
16. One of the interesting things about final offer arbitration is that it has been put in
place by explicit agreement of adversarial parties and, even where imposed on them, its strat
egy of giving the outsider less flexibility than other forms of arbitration draws on the effi
ciency we might associate with explicit rather than implicit cooperation.
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A more qualified claim about markets as pie-splitting devices is

that, in some settings, the expected cost of agreeing on a division of

gains exceeds the cost of resorting to a market. One intriguing pos
sibility is that implicit cooperation through the market comes close
to guaranteeing an equal division, or perhaps maximin solution,

which may be important for competitors who adopt risk averse
strategies aimed at ensuring that their competitors do not gain any
relative cost advantage.17 It is possible that an outside supplier

gives a better price to another customer� but this is more easily
overcome than is the problem of collusion between one's

competitor-coventurer and a mutually employed agent.18 Worse is

the prospect of cooperating by buying from one's competitor an in

put that both need and that the competitor makes. The competitor

has superior information about costs and can easily charge more

than its internal cost. In short, implicit cooperation through mar
kets may be a tool for ensuring an acceptable, perhaps equal divi

sion of gains among competitors.

I refer to this markets-as-equal-dividers idea as a qualified claim

about the nature of markets as facilitators - as opposed to the

rougher, more intuitive claim that competitors abhor explicit coop
eration but sometimes tolerate cooperation that is less evident both because it cannot do the entire descriptive job on its own and
because it is a bit ex post in its character. Its inadequacy is evident

in the case of competing law schools, for instance. The competition

between New York University and Columbia Law Schools, to take
two rivals who could cooperate more than they do, does not have

terribly much to do wfth prices and profit margins. If, contrary to
fact, we found a much higher ratio of explicit to implicit coopera
tion between these schools than was observed between rival auto

makers or mail-order retailers, then the equal division argument
would be quite appealing because the relative importance of im

plicit cooperation and equal division of gains would be linked to

competitors who paid a great deal of attention to profits and

prices.19 Instead, the law school example suggests that something

else, perhaps simply the rough claim about individuals' emotional

reactions to competitors, unconstrained or imperfectly constrained
by market forces, is in the air.

17. The idea is that if not for risk aversion they might be happy to compete with one
another for a better price in the marketplace.
18. The outsider is subject to competitive pressure from new entrants.
19. In other words, if there were relatively more cooperation in the for-profit sector, then
implicit cooperation could be easily associated with price competition, and risk aversion re
garding the division of gain or relative cost advantages.
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The ex post quality of the claim about markets-as-equal-dividers
is apparent when considering cases such as law schools' implicit co
operation with respect to outside fundraising consultants and auto
makers' disinclination to use the same advertising agencies but will
ingness to advertise in the same media. If schools declined to coop
erate over consultants, we might attribute their behavior to fears of
getting advice that was too close to what their competitors received
or, perhaps, so dissimilar as likely to be inferior. The fact that some
firms cooperate by employing outside consultants can be explained
instead by suggesting either that equal division of the raw (mone
tary) kind is unimportant to these organizations20 or that the
schools are sophisticated customers who can always reject the con
sultant's advice if it seems biased, inferior, or inappropriate to their
competitive positions. Similarly, the distinction that auto makers
seem to draw between advertising agencies and media may reflect
fears that advertising campaigns will be insufficiently competitive
- favoring one's adversary - and that creative geniuses who are
difficult to monitor might devote more energy or use their best
ideas to satisfy a competitor's needs. In contrast, the location and
even prices of media slots are easier to monitor and are only ran
domly advantageous. If, however, we observed the reverse set of
inclinations to cooperate, so that advertising agencies were shared
while media outlets were not, it would be possible to believe the
opposite, that agencies' commissions promoted equal treatment21
while the dearth of information about the true cost of, say, televi
sion time - and especially of the premiums paid for the most popu
lar time slots - accounted for the refusal to share even implicitly in
this market.22 Ex post rationalizations can be the source of truth or
at least of elegance, but there is a justifiable inclination to regard
these sorts of explanations as tainted and unscientific.

20. And the inclination not to cooperate with respect to permanent fundraisers or devel
opment programs would need to be explained on simpler transaction cost or signaling
grounds.
21. Analogously; of all the problems and puzzles posed by real estate agents, there does
not seem to be a fear that they will unequally divide the gains from cooperation. See Saul
Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate Bro
kers, Underwriters, and Other Agents' Rewards, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 503 (1993).
22. Note that while real estate agents cooperate explicitly in many regions by publishing
magazines in which competing real estate brokers buy pages (and bypass local newspapers),
competing auto makers do not advertise in this explicitly parallel manner although, to a lim
ited degree, some do cooperate through single dealerships.
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The Future of Implicit Cooperation

Other examples supporting the markets-as-equal-dividers and
markets-as-pride-preservers ideas are offered below butthe overall
impression will, I think, remain the same. These ideas take us a
long way toward explaining instances of explicit and implicit coop
eration, as well as apparent refusals to cooperate, but they do not
quite rise to the level of reliable predictors. Further thought may
point to additional or alternative variables which succeed in form
ing a really useful theory of cooperation.
The discussion has implicitly assumed that the world we observe
is characterized by fairly competitive firms in a sort of equilibrium.
Some latitude has been granted for hubris, pride, and fear. Indeed,
absolutely perfect competition might be inconsistent with the rough
claim about markets as facilitators of cooperation and even with the
more nuanced claim of markets-as-equal-dividers.
Some readers will prefer a more futuristic and perhaps optimis
tic perspective, motivated by the reasoning that competition will
eventually drive out petty human foibles. Entire industries do look
different now that competition has become more globalized, and it
is easy to put some stock in the idea that innovation, efficiency, new
management techniques, and comparative advantage dominate
while tradition, incremental change, and a good deal of neoclassical
economic thinking decline. From this perspective, Columbia and

NYU law schools might continue to recall ancient snubs or to de
cline to minimize some costs because of emotions such as envy,
pride, and condescension, but auto makers, retailers, and other par
ticipants in less protected markets will be unable to afford such sen
timents.

This view assumes that efficiency considerations alone

suggest more cooperation than is presently found,23 and it insists
that at the very least we will observe more implicit cooperation as
innovators develop low-transaction-cost methods of serving multi
ple firms. A piece of supporting evidence is that many of the indus
tries in which we observe regular, explicit cooperation tend to be
quite competitive. For example, competitor airlines serve as agents
for one another, selling seats on one another's flights, and
overbooked hotels place disappointed customers in competing es
tablishments.24 But even if global competition will generate in23. See infra Part III.
24. Note that the theories advanced in the present essay are necessarily incomplete be
cause I make no further attempt to explain which firms or industries will fail to display a
disinclination to cooperate. For every airline-industry sort of example there is a mail-order
retailer kind of counterexample with plenty of competition but little cooperation. Indeed,
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creased cooperation, the tradeoff between implicit and explicit
cooperation remains important with the former dominating where
specialization or other advantages favor third-party facilitators over
direct trades. The notion of a disinclination to cooperate may, how
ever, join other pieces of useless and now unaffordable pomp and
ceremony in the bins of institutional history.
I hesitate to join in this view with too much enthusiasm or confi
dence. First, it is difficult to draw the line between consumption
and production costs. An affluent society can afford ceremonies
and inefficiencies; economists learn to relabel them as consumption
decisions. If enough people have a taste for corporate identities
("our way of doing things") and the like, then cooperative opportu
nities will continue to be rejected. Second, there are always func
tional

explanations

for

noncooperation.

Making

rather

than

buying, or buying from nonoverlapping suppliers, can always be ex
plained ex post as promoting learning, monitoring for quality, and
so forth. It is therefore difficult to know what level of cooperation
to associate with perfect competition. Even as we learn about ad
vantages of cooperation we appreciate gains from exclusivity, itself
a form of noncooperation.
This is probably not the place to develop other perspectives on
the future of cooperation, for the immediate point is simply that if
we believe in parties' disinclination to cooperate in some settings,
then conventional thinking about the make-or-buy decision re
quires modification. Predicting the future, or discerning whether
this disinclination is a costly taste or an efficient proxy, is a question
about the long-term trend in make-or-buy decisionmaking rather
than an inquiry into the size and behavior of presently observable
firms.
Ill.

ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON FIRM BOUNDARIES AND
NONCOOPERATION

A.

Introduction and the Possibility of Unpuzzling Cooperation

The discussion in Part II explored the idea of markets as means
of implicit cooperation by beginning to puzzle over the apparent
tolerance for impersonal markets in some of the settings where ex
plicit cooperation seems unacceptable. The puzzle was to explain
when implicit cooperation was itself likely to be observed. The dis
cussion offered some possible keys to a positive and predictive thethe airline industry itself offers a mixed message because inter-carrier booking was also the
norm when that industry was much less competitive than at present.
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ory, but their limits suggest that there may be better explanations
for noncooperation in the first place. I turn, therefore, to alterna
tive explanations, or descriptions, of the degree of cooperation
among competitors.
One reaction to the puzzle of noncooperation, of course, would
question the assumptions behind it and suggest either that there is
much more explicit and implicit cooperation than the preceding dis
cussion has identified or that we should assume that whatever level
of joint ventures or shared markets (for suppliers) we find is likely
to reflect profit maximization. Thus, instead of insisting that com
peting law schools miss opportunities to take advantage of econo
mies of scale, we might focus on their cooperative patterns. They
do, to take one example, use the same casebooks, published in the
impersonal market, but authored by faculty at home, at the compet
ing school, or elsewhere. Somewhat similarly, law firms in a single
city may decline to rent one another's associates even when it ap
pears that human capital could be efficiently shared, that one firm
has excess capacity while the other is in desperate need of labor,
and that legal rules do not necessarily prevent such cooperation.25
Law firms also seem to decline to cooperate as they might with re
spect to library facilities.26 On the other hand, competing law firms
do cooperate when covering the expenses of potential associates
whom they interview, in using the placement facilities of law
schools, in patronizing restaurants when entertaining summer asso
ciates and clients, and even in patronizing bar association libraries.
The discussion in Part II suggests that a distinguishing feature appli
cable to these examples is that implicit cooperation is found where
equal cost sharing is virtually guaranteed. But the point here is that
there may be straightforward transaction-cost explanations for all
examples of noncooperation and no residual disinclination to
cooperate.27
25. See generally Vmcent R. Johnson & Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the
Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 359
{1990).

26. The modest cooperation among law firms tbat is observed witb respect to outside
libraries highlights the absence of coventures (or rentals) by firms occupying a single office
building where tbey might, for example, maintain a single library. An optimist would say
tbat law firms fear the inappropriate exchange of information if tbeir lawyers use tbe same
tables and books, but tben it is mysterious that tbese lawyers are permitted to use university
or bar association libraries where such inadvertent exchanges might also take place. It is
possible that implicit cooperation through not-for-profit organizations reflects a bias in favor
of this sort of limited cooperation generated by the tax system.
27. Indeed in some of tbese cases, such as tbat involving travel expenses, it is almost
difficult to see how each firm could proceed without some sharing of expenses.
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An extreme example makes the arguments on both sides quite
clear. Neighboring and sometimes hostile countries are known not
only to purchase the same military aircraft from a single outside
source, but also to rely on the source country to provide training for
pilots. Put differently, part of the mystery of cooperation are the
examples where we might think that emotions like hubris and dis
trust, as well as understandable fears regarding shared or overlap
ping arrangements, run strongest, and yet we find striking albeit
implicit cooperation.28 American and United Airlines quite self
consciously cooperate when they both decide to buy a new Boeing
aircraft.

The second decisionmaker knows of the earlier move

made by its competitor and also knows that imitation may even
cause a competing manufacturer to cease production of its compet
ing airliner. India and Pakistan go even further when they both buy
F-16s because in that setting there must be some fear of nonneutral
behavior by the third-party provider in the quality of training, the
disclosure of secrets, or the later supply of spare parts.29 The opti
mist would say that these are additional examples of implicit coop
eration among competitors and that occasional self-containment
found in other examples does not reflect an inefficient disinclina
tion to cooperate. Alternatively, it is arguable that the third-party
supplier of military aircraft is trusted because its reputation for
even-handedness is critical to its dominance of the market. Mean
while, the puzzler might say that India and Pakistan would prefer
not to cooperate but there is simply no second source offering
equivalent aircraft.
Other examples come to mind but the essential point needs, I
think, no additional confirmation: the puzzle of the sometime coex
istence of competition and cooperation is fairly subjective. As with
so many puzzles about rational behavior, a reasonable person might
think that there is no puzzle to explain. Even if the amount of ex
plicit cooperation among certain kinds of competitors were zero,
while scores of examples of potential but unseen implicit coopera
tion through markets were enumerated, an honest observer could
think that these realities simply reflected dispassionate transaction
28. There are very few cases that can be described in this manner where explicit coopera·
tion is actually found. I do not dwell on these cases because the very nature of the mistrust
raises the problem of interpreting cooperation, which can simply be rationalized as an exam·
pie of two enemies wishing to keep a close eye on one another. To take a political example,
the Democrats and Republicans might sometimes entrust a sensitive matter to an independ·
ent outsider but at other times choose to appoint a joint venture with personnel drawn from
the ranks of the party faithful but with an equal number from each party.

29. The example thus weakens any claim that cooperation is avoided where there is confi·
dential information at stake.
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cost minimization. Ford does sell cars with the very same tires
found on comparable cars made by GM, such an observer might
note, so why insist that they should offer the same engine whether
made by an outside supplier who supplies both auto makers or by
GM itself? Such an observer might be interested in some discus
sion of legal barriers to cooperation but the make-or-buy expres
sion would largely capture the decisionmaking which determines
the boundaries of the firm. The observer who shares the intuition
that Ford (or GM) chooses not to cooperate is most interested in
the question of when competitors do cooperate, explicitly and im
plicitly.30

And this perspective recharacterizes the inquiry into

make-or-buy as influenced by the disinclination to cooperate even
so far as to cause firms sometimes neither to make nor buy.
B.

Alternative Explanations of Noncooperation
1.

Slack and Not-for-Profit Enterprises

The example of noncooperation between law schools combined
with the possible role played by pride suggests that some attention
be paid to the idea that noncooperation may be a taste affordable
by not-for-profit organizations and by firms operating in imperfect,
profit-oriented markets where there is sufficient slack to finance
prideful tastes. GM might be described as less disinclined to coop
erate than it was in the days before robust global competition. And
a country purchasing military hardware, the argument might pro
ceed, can ill afford to satisfy its emotional preferences when life and
death may be at issue.
There are obvious inconsistencies in this story. Retailers oper
ate in an extremely competitive environment and yet, as we have
seen, they too can appear disinclined to cooperate. Law firms have
broken many traditions as competition among them has sharpened,
but still they do not rent one another's associates. There is no
shortage of examples of tough and otherwise lean competitors who
seem to eschew cooperation. Moreover, the idea of linking this in
clination to some kind of prideful sentiment did not hold up on
close inspection nearly as well as the claim that markets served to
guarantee equal divisions of gains from trade. Iri turn, neither a
desire for equal division nor the ability of impersonal markets to
30. For what it is worth, I have not yet encountered a faculty member or administrator at
Columbia or NYU who thought those schools' behavior could be explained by anything but
unilateral or mutual disinclinations to cooperate.
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generate such division of gains from trade offers much of a reason
to distinguish profit-seeking from other enterprises.
I have suggested elsewhere that not-for-profit organizations
might tackle the make-or-buy choice in a manner that is different
from profit-seeking enterprises.31 In particular, my claim was that
the former group might be slower to expand but also slower to con
tract. I do not see a need to retreat from this claim, but the greater
the role played by the disinclination to cooperate the less important
the distinction between profit-oriented and not-for-profit firms.
2.

Consumer Ignorance or Product Differentiation

Another approach draws on the idea that firms may survive or
profit because of imperfect markets and consumer ignorance. Igno
rance is of course often related to slack if only because market
power may derive more from excessive brand loyalty than from
structural barriers to entry and the like. In any event, it is possible
that competing law schools rarely cooperate because they perceive
that cooperation will be taken as a sign of weakness so that they
will lose in the market for students, employers, or even faculty.
Two elite law schools might both lose out to other law schools, or
perhaps simply to others in that city or region, if the two cooperate.
I refer to this explanation as one based on consumer ignorance
because, in theory, consumers should evaluate products and prices
with little concern about the source of inputs. If Chrysler or Co
lumbia sells a car or education with components supplied by major
competitors, consumers might do well to conclude that the well
informed manufacturer or assembler they have selected has decided
that the best supplier of that particular component happens to be
an outsider. The intruding component might signal the presence of
a flexible, sensible assembler who is unswayed by anything resem
bling pride, which in this context can be of negative value to the
consumer. On the other hand, the component may signal declining
internal quality control, excessive attention to short-run costs, or
other things that ought to worry purchasers of complex products. A
problem with this sort of thinking is that positive signals are easy to
imitate or contrive, so that they are of little value in a world with
rational or thoughtful actors. In tum, an explanation of competi
tion and cooperation that is based on the idea of cooperation as a
negative signal must assume some significant irrationality or
ignorance.
31.

See Levmore, supra note 4, at 356-58.
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An alternative perspective is to think of the assembler as engag
ing in strategic decisionmaking rather than appealing to ignorant
consumers. One law school or auto maker may avoid mixing in a
competitor's inputs because it expects to gain from forcing consum
ers to make a starker choice. Put slightly differently, a firm may
capitalize on its comparative advantage by engaging in significant
product differentiation; advantages may be dissipated if shared with
a competitor. For better or worse, this kind of claim is not easily
disproved. When Ford and GM offer identical tires, it is arguable
that each calculates that it will gain by competing with respect to
other components. When they decline to cooperate it can be ar
gued that at least one of these competitors expects to gain from
forcing consumers to choose between its product and those made
by competitors - which differ on many counts.
A fair amount of circumstantial evidence supports the consumer
ignorance version, or explanation, of competition and cooperation,
and much of this evidence might also be marshaled in support of
the product differentiation perspective. Consider, for example, the
fact that local governments often cooperate not only by patronizing
specialized third-party suppliers but also by explicitly buying and
selling services among themselves. It is not unusual for a city to sell
firefighting services or to supply water or natural gas to a neighbor
ing jurisdiction. Joint ventures are another common means by
which local governments exploit economies of scale. At the state
level, other forms of cooperation are noteworthy. Neighboring
states sometimes have reciprocal or fee-driven arrangements which
enable residents of one state to attend state-supported universities
in the other. When an arrangement permits residents of a state
with no veterinary school, medical school, or law school to attend
one in another state, there is an obvious economy of scale but also,
by negative implication, cooperation only where there is no compe
tition and no danger of a negative signal.32 In any event, these in
stances of cooperation might be traced to the distinction between
profit-oriented and other enterprises, but I have already marked
that route and little would be gained by traveling it once again ex32. But the lack of cooperation when both states have these schools does not necessarily
reflect a disinclination to cooperate or a belief that cooperation sends negative signals. The
potential gain in consumer choice or specialization may simply be more than offset by the
transaction costs of the arrangement. In most instances where there is no explicit coopera
tion between neighboring states, residents of one state can apply as would residents of any
other state to the host state's school. The question of cooperation arises only where tuition
and admission preferences in a nearby state might reduce the political pressure for duplica
tive investments in facilities.
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cept to point out that political jurisdictions or politicians may be
less risk averse than private :firms about unequal divisions of the
gains from trade. Emphasis is better placed, I think, on the possi
bility that jurisdictions compete less fiercely than do manufacturers.
Ford may worry that if it offers a car with a GM component, loyal
Ford consumers will begin to think that Ford is confessing a decline
in its own abilities. Alternatively, Ford may reason, contrary to the
simple lesson of the spatial competition literature, that it gains from
greater product differentiation. To the extent that local jurisdic
tions compete for new residents and businesses they too might
either fear sending negative signals or wish to differentiate them
selves from one another as a competitive strategy. But some polit
ical jurisdictions, most notably states, might need to worry much
less about exit than most retailers and manufacturers because op
portunities for consumer relocation are more limited. If, in turn,
there is indeed more cooperation among state governments than
among competing private :firms, then the signaling, product differ
entiation, and perhaps consumer ignorance notions ought to gain
credence.
Another piece of supporting evidence, albeit of the negative
kind, is that competing profit-oriented :firms seem willing to borrow
from the same lenders. Not only do they appeal to the same pur
chasers of their stocks and bonds but they also use the same com
mercial banks and financial intermediaries. As always, there may
be efficiency gains from cooperation; specialized lenders may have
already invested in information about the given industry. The lack
of explicit cooperation is not terribly puzzling, for GM may fear
that if it borrows directly from Ford the latter would one day call in
its loans or exercise possible rights in collateral in pursuit of some
strategic, market-grabbing aim that would be difficult to stop with
ex ante contractual specifications. And if, contrary to fact, we
found competitors disinclined to cooperate even in implicit fashion,
we might ascribe their behavior to fears about inappropriate infor
mation exchanges or fiduciary problems. It happens that there is
remarkably little in the way of fiduciary or other legal constraints
where lending is concerned, and there is a fair amount of implicit
cooperation.33 This cooperation can in tum be taken as evidence
that where there is a disinclination to cooperate there is likely to be
a problem of negative signaling; the fungibility of money means
33. A topic I touch on in Part IV but consider more seriously in a companion paper, Saul
Levmore, Efficiency and Conspiracy: Conflicts of Interest, Anti-Nepotism Rules, and Separa
tion Strategies, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2099 {1998) {1997 Levine Lecture).
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that borrowing from one source as opposed to another sends no
signals. Noncooperation may also be linked through this example
to consumer ignorance because even impressionable, unsophistica
ted consumers might be thought to understand that there is not nor
mally much to be learned from the identity of GM's lender, be it
Chase Manhattan Bank, Ford, or an outsider who does not lend to
Ford. Finally, cooperation in the form of overlapping credit ar
rangements is consistent with the product differentiation argument;
a Ford car and a Columbia education look very different from prod
ucts offered by their competitors because they contain few identical
components - but the source of funds is not something visible to
consumers and competitors can therefore share creditors without
sacrificing any product differentiation.
The major weakness with the signaling and product differentia
tion explanations is that they fail to explain the mix of implicit co
operation and contrary disinclinations.

If Ford would signal

something negative or cleverly differentiate its product by offering
a car with a component that is also found on a GM product, why
then is this apparently not the case for tires? And why would law
students be especially attracted to self-contained producers who are
disinclined to cooperate with competing law schools?34
A further weakness of the signaling explanation applies to pride
as well as to signals. It is noteworthy that some of the best exam
ples of cooperation among universities occur precisely where mar
kets are segmented and competition is therefore avoided. Single
sex, neighboring schools often cooperated in offering cross-listed
courses and programs far more than did schools which competed
directly with one another. But pride might have prevented such
confessions about one's weaknesses in both markets, and the prob
lem of negative signals should have caused Columbia College, when
it had only male students, to refuse to cross-list with Barnard be
cause applicants choosing between Columbia and other Ivy League
schools, for instance, would see this as a sign of weakness on Co
lumbia's part.
Note that this last example favors both the equal division and
product differentiation ideas. Harvard and Northeastern - which
proudly announce their different aims and markets - do not coop34. The consumer ignorance explanation might be salvaged with some painstaking identi
fication of consumers' perceptions regarding the core function of an enterprise, with the idea
being that cooperation in this core is what threatens to transmit a negative signal. The in
quiry is then similar to that mentioned earlier in connection with firm pride. Cooperation
with respect to tires but not engines is consistent with either of these theories.
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erate any more than do Columbia and NYU. Both pride and nega
tive signals might explain that set of disinclinations, with pride

perhaps dominating if the perception is that Harvard and MIT co

operate relatively frequently.35 Still, the equal division idea makes

some sense of both the Harvard-Northeastern and Columbia
Barnard examples. Where the market is segmented, the partici
pants care less about giving competitors a slight cost advantage.
Columbia and Barnard were thus able to cross-list courses and to
offer reciprocal library privileges. Where segmentation arises from
perceived quality, as in Harvard's success in attracting students with
more outstanding academic records than those drawn to

Northeastern, there would be much more of a perceived and per
haps actual inefficiency in cross-listing courses. The equal division

idea thus seems more useful in understanding the disinclination of
direct competitors to cooperate. Pride can be wounded and nega
tive signals might be transmitted just as much through cooperation
with non-competitors as with competitors; equal division concerns
are largely limited to direct competitors. The product differentia

tion notion is, like the equal division claim, consistent with the ob
servation about segmented markets and cooperation because with
less direct rivalry there is less of a need for strategic differentiation.
3.

Labor versus Capital

Some of the examples adduced thus far suggest that competitors
are more willing to engage in implicit cooperation with respect to
capital than labor. Law schools rarely share faculty members but
they do not seek exclusive arrangements36 with computer vendors,

furniture makers, or research services. Competing auto makers do
not cooperate with respect to employing designers, advertising
agencies, and law firms, while they are willing to buy steel and fin
ished tires from the same suppliers.
35. Unless the perception is that Harvard gives up any claim in sciences and engineering
while MIT shrugs off a variety of areas. There are in fact schools with catalogues that suggest
credit for courses taken elsewhere only where the home school offers nothing comparable,
but Harvard and MIT do not fall into this set and many of their faculty and administrators
would strongly resist the extreme specialization claims that outsiders might make about these
institutions.
36. I have avoided implicating the literature on exclusive dealing. The arrangements puz
zled over here do not generally involve exclusive dealing, but rather something less than
exclusivity. Moreover, the clever explanations advanced in such works as Howard P. Marvel,
Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1982), and Victor Goldberg, Enforcing Resale Price
Maintenance: The FTC Investigation of Lenox, 18 AMER. Bus. L.J. 225 (1980), are of little
application to these puzzles of cooperation. Lands' End does sell belts other than Coach's
and if Coach is happy to see its products alongside Lands' End's, it ought to be pleased to be
seen in competitors' catalogues.
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There may be something to this distinction but I hesitate to put
much weight on it because it is often difficult to separate labor from
capital. Competitors in some industries rarely share real estate, but
is this an example of noncooperation with respect to a physical as
set or with regard to the human services reflected in the negotia
tions with a real estate agent or contractor?37 The example also
suggests that labor may be a proxy for problems with fair division,
with the labor-capital distinction doing no additional work. Simi
larly, striking examples of noncooperation are found with respect to
delivery services. The Washington Post and The New York Times
are rarely delivered by the same agent, although duplication of
routes is quite remarkable.38 The example supports the labor
capital distinction but even more forcefully bolsters the equal divi
sion idea.
Moreover, there are striking counterexamples to explain. Com
peting gasoline companies rarely if ever cooperate explicitly at the
retail level although there is some implicit cooperation by way of
sales through independents with nonexclusive supply contracts. Ex
plicit cooperation is easy to imagine. Exxon, Shell, and Mobil gas
might be sold at a single station with customers selecting their
brand at the pump much as these very gas stations often put Pepsi
and Coke machines side by side.39 The efficiency gain from such
37. Note that neither pride nor negative signaling offers much in the way of an explana
tion of the real estate example.
38. Other examples include milk delivery (where duplication and noncooperation may
have accelerated the decline of the industry in favor of more frequent trips to grocery stores)
and express mail. Federal Express and its competitors could cooperate by having a single
messenger visit each small business location. In the long run, we may observe a kind of
implicit cooperation of just this sort by way of businesses offering short-term monopolies to
the lowest bidder from among the competing express services. There would still be some
duplication of routes, unless the bids perfectly segregated the market geographically, but
much less duplication of elevator trips and the like. Note that the United States Postal Ser
vice - much more than Federal Express - does in fact explicitly cooperate by contracting
for trucks and aircraft in a manner that permits cooperation with other shippers and travel
ers. See generally Leonard Merewitz & Mark A. Zupan, Franchise Bidding, Contracting Out,
and Worksharing in the Production of Postal Services, in REGULATION AND THE NATURE OF
PoSTAL AND DELIVERY SERVICES 69 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 1993).
39. A tempting explanation for noncooperation is that retailers might mislead customers
and suppliers by connecting hoses to underground tanks in a manner that simply delivered
the cheapest gas to the customer regardless of the latter's expressed preference at the pump.
But this explanation standing alone is unconvincing because cooperation might still be worth
while through a dealer who precommitted to buy gas from competing suppliers at a uniform
price, because occasional monitoring with severe penalties ought to discourage dealer fraud,
and because we find single-brand stations offering several grades of gasoline even though a
similar fraud problem presents itself with these tanks. The brand-name supplier's incentive
to monitor means that inter-brand fraud is probably less serious a problem than the fairly
substantial problem of fraud as to grade. See I.P.L. Ping & David Reitman, Why are Some
Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 207, 213 (1995) (noting that in one study
15.4% of premium gasoline samples were substandard). Note that the same unsatisfactory
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implicit cooperation - or explicit cooperation, if one of these com
panies owns the station - could be quite considerable inasmuch as
many stations operate at undercapacity, in terms of both labor and
·
capital, in off-peak hours. And the puzzle of noncooperation is
striking because it involves such a small labor component.40

4.

Competitive Strategies

I do not mean to slight the optimistic, positivist argument that
cooperation is found wherever it is profitable. Observers may sim
ply be unable to discern all the good reasons for apparent noncoop
eration. Intriguing explanations for noncooperation will often raise
interesting questions as to whether competitive strategies are so
cially beneficial. Thus, GM may not wish to buy an input from
Ford, even when the comparative advantage lies with Ford, because
GM may not want to inform Ford of GM's own assessment of its
production volumes or relative weaknesses. Lands' End may not
want to order from L.L. Bean because it too may reveal proprietary
information about its own sales expectations, and L.L. Bean may
not want to supply Lands' End because to do so may give the latter
an opportunity to test price elasticities or marketing strategies that

will one day be used by Lands' End to the detriment of L.L. Bean.
These examples make the law school world all the more intriguing
because there are few secrets in that industry but yet little coopera
tion of a certain kind.
In the end, the success of a new explanatory theory is often a
subjective matter. In a world with noise and imperfect insight, rea
sonable people can disagree about whether conventional explana
tions are adequate, and new explanations come with their own
triumphs and weaknesses.

Much depends on subjective assess

ments of striking successes and puzzling failures.
explanation might be tried for the question of why restaurants do not offer both Coke and
Pepsi while grocery stores do. In this case, however, the fraud explanation is even weaker
because of the presence of restaurant patrons with refined taste buds.

40. The equal division explanation is somewhat more successful, although cooperation
and equal division would seem manageable through the use of a cost·sharing formula based
on gallons sold. It is difficult to think of reasons why gasoline should be such a prominent
example of an item sold through stand-alone retailers. A store that sells only Coach leather
products or Krispy Kreme donuts can focus its marketing efforts and enjoy other advantages,
but then it loses some gains from cooperation in terms of off-peak hours and attracting con
sumers who care about reducing their shopping time. Stand-alone donut stores have in fact
given way somewhat to the creation of outlets in supermarkets and convenience stores, even
though those stores carry competing products, but the combination seems sensible because
these stores have serious overcapacity in the morning, donut hours. Gasoline is sometimes
sold by convenience stores, but not alongside competing products.
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THE ROLE OF LAW

1bis is not the place for an extended discussion of the limited
role of law in influencing the make-or-buy-or-decline-to-share deci
sion.41 But a few observations about the role of law are surely in
order. A good starting point is to see that implicit cooperation may
be compelled or discouraged by legal rules. If A is barred by law
from dealing with B, but is permitted to do so by "cleansing" the
transaction through a third party, C, then it may be that C's market
success is rather simply explained. Similarly, if C is barred by such
things as conflict of interest rules from transacting with both A and
B, who are actual or potential competitors, then it may be the law
that discourages cooperation and encourages A and B to be self
contained and to grow.42
As for the overall influence of law on the siz� of a firm, or on
the make-or-buy decision, much depends on whether the relevant
legal rules have regulatory bite or simply provide default rules of
the kind most parties would bargain for were they well informed
and unimpeded by transaction costs. Law's impact might be posi
tive if it offers the right default rules for resolving prickly problems
with respect to sharing gains from trade, but negative if the law
stands in the way of arrangements that would otherwise materialize
in private markets.
My own view is that lawyers have historically and perhaps self
ishly gravitated toward rather extreme solutions, in the name of fi
duciary duties, to the conflicts that are present in these contexts. In
contrast, most markets have evolved in a way that suggests a rather
limited role for law and forced noncooperation. Put differently,
even if it is correct to suggest that equal-division concerns explain a
great deal of observed unregulated behavior, it may be unnecessary
and inefficient to force equal division on parties. But these obser
vations are only suggestive and subsidiary to the more general puz
zles associated with competition and cooperation and to the
·

solutions explored here.43
41. For an extended discussion of just this topic, see Levmore, supra notes 4, 33.
42. Alternatively, the law may cause contraction if internal production is too costly.
43. I have intentionally advanced examples where the role of law is quite minimal. I
have, for instance, avoided the case of cooperation in the form of competitors patronizing a
single law firm for such things as environmental or insurance defense work. The companion
paper, cited in note 33, discusses lawyers, bankers, trustees, government employees, and
other third-party suppliers whose roles may be guided or constrained substantially by legal
rules.
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CONCLUSION
Some readers will not share my intuition that many competitors
are in fact irrationally, or perhaps I should say disappointingly, dis
inclined to cooperate. My aim has been to supply a better under
standing of where we observe cooperation and where we do not. I
have stressed the idea of thinking of markets as means of implicit
cooperation that can offer a method of dividing gains from trade
rather equally so as to facilitate further cooperation and efficiencies
among competitors who are fearful of bestowing cost advantages on
one another. A variety of observations were illuminated by this
idea of implicit cooperation as facilitating equal division.
In any event, I think it is evident that to the extent there is in
deed something of a disinclination to share, whatever its origin and

location, it has a significant bearing on the make-or-buy decision
and firm size. In the course of covering many disparate examples,
the analysis here has been subjective in its assessment of the degree
of implicit cooperation that is observed, but observations about ex
plicit cooperation seem much less open to interpretation. It is, of
course, this kind of cooperation, involving the willingness or failure
to trade directly, that most immediately affects the boundaries of
the firm.

